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Birth Control
The recent decision, on June 7, of the
United States Supreme Court in the Connecticut birth control case has come under
considerable attack by some because of
the Court's presumed law making. Like
much other litigation brought before the
Court in recent years, Griswold v. Connecticut appears to be representative of
what has been termed "associational jurisprudence," or the planned use by interest
groups of the judicial processes in order
to establish new law and thus advance
their social aims. But all of this is entirely
proper and long practiced. Here the interest group was Planned Parenthood, and
the judicial processes were invoked
through deliberate violation of a statute
believed (correctly, so it turns out) invalid. Twice before, in 1942 and 1961,
the attempt had been made, by similar
means, to get a decision of unconstitutionality from the Supreme Court, but in
both cases the Court refused to entertain
jurisdiction. On this third try, the Court
decided the case on its merits and handed
a signal victory to the contesters of Connecticut's eighty-six year old statute which
made the use of contraceptives a crime.
The case under discussion involved
Estelle T. Griswold, Executive Director of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Yale professor, Dr. C. Lee
Buxton, Medical Director for the League,
who opened a birth control clinic at New

Haven in 1961, thereafter giving instruction on contraception at the clinic to married persons. Buxton was a veteran of the
1961 litigation. Their arrests and convictions followed, under the Connecticut
statute rendering accessories criminally
liable. The underlying crime to which
they were judged accessories was violation
of the aforementioned statute providing
that "any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose
of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned
not less than sixty days. . . ." Connecticut
courts upheld the convictions.
The July 9 issue of Commonweal contains an extremely interesting and scholarly commentary on the case entitled "The
Court and Birth Control." The author,
William B. Ball, discusses the decision
first as a matter of constitutional law. He
raises the point that seven justices agreed
that the statute violated the right of marital privacy, and they have collectively
elevated the long-mooted "right to be let
alone" to a new status in our constitutional
law. (Precisely what that status is, is a
bit in doubt, thanks to two basically different theories presented by majority members. Plainly, however, it has been strikingly improved.) Justices Black and Stewart, in dissent, argued in part for the right
of states to be let alone by the Court,
and in part that no specific "right of privacy" is to be found in the Constitution.
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Justice Black who, in his twenty-eight
years on the high court, has not been a
notable apostle of judicial restraint, lambasted the employment of a "natural law
due process theory" as the means "to invalidate any legislative act which the
judges find irrational, unreasonable or
offensive." While Black's indictment is
already serving as fresh ammunition for
critics of the Warren Court, both its deriding of "natural law due process" thinking and its intended doctrinal effect with
respect to invasions of personal liberty by
governmental action deserve rebuttal. Perhaps the best rebuttal is to be found in the
essays of the majority members whom
Black put under fire.
Justices Douglas and Clark found the
right in what Douglas called "emanations"
of other privacy-related provisions of the
bill of rights. The fourth amendment, for
example, provides a right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and Douglas noted that the Court had long since
agreed that this amendment really affords
protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life." So through
similar "emanations" of the first, third,
fifth and ninth amendments did Douglas
see a "zone of privacy" created as a distinct and recognizable constitutional guarantee, a sort of penumbra of the bill of
rights. Douglas placed the relationship of
marriage well within that zone. The antiuse statute, he said, sought to achieve
goals by means destructive of that relationship which is "intimate to the degree of
being sacred."
Justices Harlan, Goldberg, Warren,
Brennan and White, agreeing that the
statute involved a right of marital privacy,
disagreed with the Douglas-Clark view that
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that right was a thing pieced together out
of other bill of rights provisions. Rather,
they turned to language of the fourteenth
amendment which prohibits state action
depriving any person of life, liberty or
property "without due process of law."
They noted that the Court had long since
interpreted this language to refer to those
rights so basic as to be "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," and they
found that, in the Connecticut case, such
a basic right had been violated. Justice
Goldberg, in an eloquent concurring opinion, called the right of privacy "a fundamental personal right." "Although the
Constitution," he said, "does not speak in
so many words of the right of privacy in
marriage, I cannot believe that it offers
these fundamental rights no protection."
He added that "the entire fabric of the
Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy
and to marry and raise a family are of
similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected." Analyzing the Black-Stewart view that no
specific right of marital privacy exists,
Goldberg concluded: "if a law outlawing
voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning,
a law requiring compulsory birth control
would also seem to be valid," and that the
latter law would be "totalitarian."
Mr. Ball's reaction to the adverse comment made by some Catholic commentators on the case is that it has centered
upon the reliance of several of the majority upon the ninth amendment-"The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
The point is peripheral. The true focus of
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the case is its powerful vindication of the
right of privacy in marriage as a part of
our essential constitutional liberties. Radiations of this right, going well beyond use
of contraceptives, were indicated at various points by the majority justices-as,
for example, "the marital relation" generally, "the marital home," the right "to
bring up children," "the private realm of
family life." While press reaction has
focused too little upon these significant
and inevitable inclusions of the decision,
it has speculated widely concerning
changes in public law which may be
sparked by the decision.
Developing the positive aspects of the
decision, which flow from the "right of
privacy" protection, Mr. Ball concludes
that rather than finding in Griswold v.
Connecticut a legal buttressing of statesupported family planning programs, one
may well find in the totality of the Court's
recent pronouncements on governmental
coercion, rights of conscience and rights
of privacy, a doctrinal position on birth
control closely paralleling the Court's position on religion and governmental action
-namely, that government should be neutral, neither penalizing birth control nor
promoting it.

Grave questions, indeed, respecting the
coercive power of the state in relation to
the indigent individual are posed by many
of the loosely worded family planning
programs now cropping up at local, state
and federal levels. The view taken by the
Court in the school prayer cases that
coercion of conscience of the child was
implicit in the mere passive presence of the
state in sponsoring the "voluntary" religious programs would appear not inapplicable to the situation where the indigent
mother on relief is interviewp! by a gov-

ernmental bureau. The reach of the inquisitorial power of the state in the
caseworker-client relationship, moreover,
raises most serious questions precisely in
the area of privacy now constitutionally
zoned by the Supreme Court. Does it extend to such matters as frequency of sexual
intercourse, ethical outlook, savings habits,
drinking habits? What may be made a
matter of record, and what guarantees of
confidentiality are legally mandated? How
far (apart from birth control) may the
"planning" in family planning be carried?
Some may see in these programs a sort
of new Comstockery, with a now highly
managerial paternalism toward the poor
and often unspoken puritanical assumptions respecting "undesirables."
The
whispered eugenicism in all too many welfare circles identifies these undesirables as
Negroes. The overtones here are overpopulation, "but the undertone is unter
mensch."
The vital questions raised by state family planning programs have been little
asked, and certainly they have not been
answered by the routine Catholic blasts
at the programs as "violating God's law"
or as "state-promoted promiscuity." Perhaps the new Court decision will now
serve to induce discussion of these programs in terms of rights of privacy-a
civil frame of reference meaningful to all
in the community.
Obscenity
Readers of The Catholic Lawyer who
have expressed interest in the recent symposium on "Obscenity and the Law"
which appeared in the Autumn 1964 issue
will find further remedial suggestions on
the subject in a two part article published
in the February and April 1965 issues of
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the New York State Bar Journal. The article, by Samuel H. Hofstadter and Shirley
R. Levittan, sheds new light on a subject
now receiving a great deal of judicial attention.
According to the authors, the Supreme
Court, in Roth v. United States, set forth
twin constitutional norms in conjunction
with each other-that the material must
be judged as a whole and that it must be
examined in the light of its effect on the
average adult rather than by its impact on
the susceptible or immature. The intrinsic
significance of that case resides in its
articulation of this two branched criterion
rather than in its reformulation of obscenity. In so far as the Court undertook
to "define what may be indefinable," it
inevitably could only meet with indifferent
success.
On the basic assumption that pornography may not find shelter under the wing
of the first amendment, i.e., that it is not
immune from proscription, it is their submission that the desired result in the application of the law, within the criterion
established by Roth, can be best achieved
by relegating the issue in each instance
to a local jury, which shall be the sole
judge of the law and the facts. At one time
it was the rule in all criminal cases, and it
continues to obtain in libel cases to this
day. Pornography has never been within
the protection of the first amendment.
Obscenity is not a true constitutional problem but rather one of application of generally valid statutes. Hence, when an effort
is made to bring matter within its protection, the Supreme Court should be more
diffident in arrogating to itself subjective
evaluations. This is a jury's function.
Holmes' admonition is particularly pertinent:
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We ought to remember the great caution
shown by the Constitution in limiting the
power of the States, and should be slow to
construe . . . [it] as committing to the
Court, with no guide but the Court's own
discretion, the validity of whatever laws
the States may pass.
In the context of pornography, the jury
process is uniquely salutary and thus imperative. Justice Brennan once noted:
The jury represents a cross-section of the
community and has a special aptitude for
reflecting the views of the average person. Jury trials for obscenity provide a peculiarly competent application of the standard for judging materials which by its definition calls for an appraisal according to
the average person of contemporary community standards.
To effectuate this thesis, we must insert
the word "local" before the word "community"; for it is the consensus of the local
community which should be determinative
in this area of human behavior and
standards.
Hofstadter and Levittan further submit
that the principle that sheer pornography,
merely because it is well written, ceases
to be pornography is a dubious one. For,
in the history of the written word, there
has always been a current of subliterature
of the obscene-sometimes created by
true men of letters from Ovid through La
Fontaine, Goethe and Mark Twain to the
"beats." The same is true of other artistic
creations. Indeed, a book or work of art
cannot acquire a patina of respectability
just from its authorship when it is, in fact,
as denuded of substance as the "Emperor's
New Clothes." It is time we acquired the
clarity of vision of the child in that well
known tale and forthrightly recognize obscene material, whatever its literary or
artistic coloration, to be what it is-ob-
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scene. For, although obscenity may be variable, it is not illusory. To all argument
predicated on artistic merit as decisive of
the constitutional question, it is sufficient
answer to say that artists are not such favorites of the law that they may ply their
craft in the teeth of a declared overriding
public policy against pornographic displays.
Doubtless, the matter like many others
in the law is one of degree. Competing
goods require a high dedication to honorable accommodation and the problem
arises frequently in connection with guarantees of individual freedom and the common weal. In broad outline, it may be
said that the salutary operative principle
is that when an element of prejudice to
individual or social right in enforcing the
law is disproportionate to the general good
(and the matter is within the area of the
first amendment), then the constitutional
guarantee is uppermost and controlling.
And, conversely, when the prejudice to a
common good is highly disproportionate to
the degree of invasion as to what would
otherwise ,be a respected individual right,
the latter becomes subordinate and the
former prevails. These imponderables involve a fine fusion of objective correlatives. There are no absolutes, but rather
tensions, in a system of checks and balances
which make for ordered freedom.
The authors conclude by reiterating
their argument that the issue of obscenity
is one of municipal order and, in that
sense, a domestic, restricted one, although
of great importance. It is essentially one
of mores obtaining in communities and
reflected in the law. Its resolution, therefore, is uniquely appropriate by local action. The Supreme Court should not attempt to force, or enforce, a national

standard that, as Chief Justice Warren
suggests, cannot exist. If various jurisdictions differed in The Tropic of Cancer
cases as to whether the book was obscene
or not, they were truly reflecting the diverse community mores of our great land.
If there is any residual validity for the
continued recognition of the federal-state
complex (and all agree that there is, although there can be honorable disagreement as to its scope), it is in this field
where mores, morals, aesthetics and the
law are so inextricably interrelated. In
our cultural pluralism, which is the essence of the American system, free play
for differences in outlook should be afforded the different communities. It is
only thus that we may reconcile the unity
in diversity which is the supreme American contribution to the history of civilized
government.
Religious Tax Exemptions
The May 1965 issue of The Catholic
World contains an article entitled "Religious Tax Exemptions and the First Amendment" by Father John J. Regan, C.M. It
forcefully presents the argument that supporters of religious tax exemptions are
consistent with the latest trends in Supreme Court interpretations of the first
amendment religion clauses.
Father Regan's observations are confined primarily to exemptions from taxes
on real property, although many of
his conclusions apply equally to other
forms of tax exemption. His emphasis
is placed chiefly on the constitutional
issues involved in tax exemptions rather
than on public policy arguments.
According to Father Regan, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue
whether such exemptions constitute a vio-
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lation of the establishment clause. The
Court had the opportunity to do so in
1956 and again in 1962 in appeals taken
from the decisions of the California and
Rhode Island Supreme Courts, but it dismissed these appeals on the ground that
they did not raise substantial federal questions. It is arguable that such dismissals
meant that these exemptions raised no real
issue with respect to the first amendment,
but it would be hazardous to say that these
dismissals give a definitive answer to the
problem.
The only other references by the Supreme Court to this problem are contained
in two of the concurring opinions in the
recent Abington School Dist. v. Schempp
decision which was decided together with
Murray v. Curlett. Justice Brennan stated
that, "nothing we hold today questions the
propriety of certain tax deductions or
exemptions which incidentally benefit
churches and religious institutions, along
with many secular charities and non-profit
organizations." Justice Douglas, however,
took the opposite stand, but without making direct reference to tax exemptions
when he said, "financing a church either
in its strictly religious activities or in its
other activities is equally unconstitutional,
as I understand the Establishment Clause."
The case against the religious tax
exemption rests on a strict interpretation
of the "no-aid" principle set forth by Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Educ.
and quoted above. Taken literally, this
principle means that the federal government and the states must not permit any
form of financial support for religious activities, even on a non-sectarian basis. The
fact that such aid is part of a general program of governmental support extended
indiscriminately to activities with secular

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SUMMER

1965

purposes is irrelevant; aid must be denied
to the religious portion of such activities.
Thus it would make no difference that the
exemption for churches is part of the overall exemption for property of all non-profit
organizations serving charitable purposes.
Justice Rutledge stated well the "strict
separationist" view in his dissenting opinion in Everson:
It [the first amendment] was to create a
complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding
every form of public aid or support for
religion. . . . The prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or other, of
religion in any guise, form or degree. It
outlaws all use of public funds for religious purposes.
Professor Paul Kauper of the University of Michigan Law School has outlined
some of the subsidiary arguments advanced by those opposing religious tax exemptions. The determination whether the
exemption applies in a given case requires
the courts to undertake the difficult task
of defining what is meant by a house of
worship or by religious activities and purposes. It is also said that churches relying
on tax exemptions become debtors to
"Caesar" and lose some of their free and
voluntary character. It has been further
argued that these exemptions are rooted in
the established state religions of the past
and should be abolished in the same fashion.
As cogent as these arguments against
the exemptions may appear, supporters of
the exemptions find them out of step with
the latest trends in Supreme Court interpretations of the religion clauses. The arguments are also relatively unsophisticated
in their treatment of so delicate an area as
the first amendment. The basic position
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favoring these exemptions likewise originates in the "no aid" dictum of Justice
Black in Everson, but its interpretation of
the dictum is tempered by what the Court
actually did in Everson (and not alone by
what it said) and by subsequent religion
decisions.
The principle of "religious neutrality"
as the working norm in governmentreligion relations provides justification for
most, if not all, of the religious tax exemptions now permitted. This principle was
best stated by Justice Clark in the recent
Schempp-Murray decision:
The test [of legislation challenged under
the establishment clause] may be stated
as follows: What are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either
is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed
by the Constitution. That is to say that
to withstand the strictures of the establishment clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The question thus is, do tax exemptions
for religious institutions have a secular
legislative purpose and is their effect primarily secular in nature? To answer this
question a distinction must be drawn between the various types of activity engaged
in by churches and religious institutions.
Such activity is frequently concerned with
education, hospitals and charitable work
for various underprivileged groups in society. Not only secular private agencies
but government itself is also concerned
with such activities, and therefore, it is
argued that tax exemptions for all organizations performing such work serve a public welfare purpose. Indeed, the efforts of
private agencies, religious or not, save government the expense of providing these

services.
The constitutional principle of religious
neutrality stated in Schempp-Murray is
reinforced by a second look at some previous court decisions. In Everson, for example, in spite of Justice Black's words
about "no aid to religion," the Court upheld the New Jersey program reimbursing parents for bus fares paid to transport
their children to parochial schools. Likewise in Zorach v. Clauson, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, spoke of the
need for government to accommodate itself to the religious interests of its people.
Finally, in the Sunday closing laws cases,
the Court found that such laws served a
secular purpose at the present time, despite their undeniably religious origin and
the fact that Christian sects benefited from
their enforcement.
This line of argument, however, cuts
two ways. If churches enjoy the same tax
exemption on secular activities as other
private agencies, they must also be prepared to forsake special exemptions when
they engage in business activities unrelated
to their religions or eleemosynary mission.
In 1964, the delegates to the first National
Study Conference on Church and State,
sponsored by the National Council of
Churches, accepted the logic of the conclusion When they expressed disapproval of
exempting the unrelated taxable business
income of church bodies. Neutrality implies no special privileges as well as no
special 'burdens for religion.
Moreover, the "secular purpose" argument has limitations. While a secular purpose can be found in many of the secular
activities and institutions of the churches,
what justification is there for governmental
support of houses of worship and of religious functions in a strict sense?
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Father Regan suggests that the answer
to this question lies in the theory of religious neutrality formulated by Professor
Wilber Katz of the University of Wisconsin. Professor Katz believes that the two
religion clauses of the first amendment
should be read together as intended to
promote a single purpose: the religious
freedom of all citizens. Ordinarily, legislation serving a secular purpose will not
run afoul of the establishment clause (by
favoring religion against non-religion or
one sect over another) or of the free exercise clause (by impairing a citizen's
freedom to practice his religion). There
are certain cases, however, where a too
rigid interpretation of the establishment
clause could lead to an interference with
religious freedom guaranteed by the free
exercise clause. Therefore he reasons that
legislatures should have at least discretionary power to create exemptions to laws
having this effect. The result of such exemptions is not to prefer religion but
rather to safeguard the religious freedom
of all citizens. On this basis he justifies
the provision by government of chaplains
for men in the armed forces and in prisons,
the exemptions from the draft laws given
to clergymen and theological students, and
the permission given to public school children to attend released time programs conducted by their churches during the regular school day.
Strong support for Professor Katz' position was recently provided by the Supreme
Court in its decision in Sherbert v. Verner.
In this case the Court upheld the claim
of a Seventh-Day Adventist for state unemployment compensation benefits, which
had been denied because of her refusal to
work on Saturday, the Sabbath of her faith.
By declaring her ineligible for benefits, the
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state forced her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting the benefits, or abandoning one
of her religious tenets in order to accept
work. The Court reasoned that government could not place a citizen in this dilemma. The net result of the decision is
to require government to grant an exemption from general legislation to a citizen
whose religious freedom would otherwise
be seriously impaired, unless a substantial
state interest dictates that the exemption
not be granted.
Applied to the tax exemption problem,
Professor Katz' and the Sherbert principles indicate legislatures have discretion
in granting exemptions from tax laws to
further the religious liberty of the citizenry.
This is not to say, however, that such exemptions are constitutionally required. It
would be pushing the principles too far to
conclude that the free exercise clause demands such exemptions without clear
proof that religious freedom would otherwise be seriously threatened.
Support for the constitutionality of religious tax exemptions is also found in
the fact that they have such a long history in this country. Professor Kauper
thus explains the argument:
This history cannot be explained solely as
a carry-over from the earlier days of established churches. These exemptions are
found also in states formed and organized
after churches had been disestablished in
the colonial states. In many states they
have also been recently amended to extend
the scope of the exemption. This suggests
a rationally conceived and deep-seated
policy, and not an accidental or vestigial
survival of outmoded practices.
On the balance, it seems that a persuasive case for many religious tax exemptions can be constructed. Only the
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Supreme Court, of course, can decide the
issue. It is important, however, that a
climate of free and open debate on the
issue be maintained until the Court has
been presented with the proper case for resolving the issue. It would be dangerous
for private citizens or public officials to
reach final opinions about the issue prematurely, as President Kennedy seemed to
do in opining that federal aid to parochial
schools was unconstitutional in the face of
strong legal opinion to the contrary. Indeed, the fact that the Supreme Court has
twice declined to pass on the issue may
foreshadow the result of any future tests
of the constitutionality of the religious tax
exemption. Perhaps, as Professor Kauper
observes, the Court is disposed to accept
Justice Holmes' axiom that a page of history is worth a volume of logic.
Federal Education Act
Writing in the May 13 issue of The
Brooklyn Tablet, Congressman Hugh L.
Carey states that the cornerstone of the
most comprehensive program of equal
opportunity ever undertaken by any nation
in history is the Federal Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 which
was signed into law on April 11.
This bill is meaningful in three aspects.
First, it is as important in its performance
as in its passage since that performance
will require enlightened implementation
to assure the full measure of its benefits to
every child in need. Second, its successful
implementation is important as a precedent and prospect of future federal assistance toward educational excellence for all
in the future. Third, the history of the
preparation and production of this bill is
significant as a basis for continuing cooperation among all interests in education.

As cleverly as this bill reconciles differences, just as clearly it does not compromise the vital and traditional principles
of educational freedom which are our inalienable birthright. There is no compromise on the parental right to freedom
of conscience in requiring religious training without the forfeiture of public benefits. There is no compromise on the guarantee of freedom under the first amendment, for no church or religion is established under the bill and no program of
education is disestablished or discriminated against because it has religious component. There is no compromise on the
principle of equal treatment of all children
under our law at the federal level. It was
worth working for five years to preserve
that principle which is as old as the Constitution and as valid today as it was in the
Northwest Ordinance. There is no compromise on our unity in diversity, our
freedom from state control and monopoly
of education or our resistance to conformity for these compromises are anathema to the individual in a free society.
Above all, according to Congressman
Carey, we have legislated a clear concept
of the federal obligation and responsibility
in education as a most significant precedent. The federal obligation is to provide
for all children in need of assistance without difference, distinction or discrimination, recognizing all interests in education,
state and private, which serve the public
purpose. The federal responsibility is to
supplement but not displace state, local,
and private resources and interests so that
quality and excellence are enriched and
local and parental control are not impaired.
Passage of the law means that funds for
pre-school, under the Economic Oppor-
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tunity Act and under the Elementary Act,
funds for facilities, equipment and personnel to aid the education of the disadvantaged, textbooks and library resources for
all children, funds for supplemental centers and research and demonstration
classes, should be in communities beginning this summer. It means that in the
immediate weeks and months ahead superintendents, teachers, specialists and librarians should initiate community-wide
discussions involving all interests without
delay.
There is no reason why a "head start"
pre-school program should not be underway in every eligible community under
public and private sponsorship wherever
appropriate, during the summer. The resources and funds are available now.
The fall semester of 1965 should incorporate dynamic and visionary curriculum changes for deprived children in all
schools developed and co-ordinated by
public and private authorities. The range
of these services should be broad and deep
as the need of the child and in every case
the need of the child should be the primary and paramount consideration determining the scope and the site of the
program. For some children it may be a
free 'hot breakfast. For others, it may be
one or more of the following: provision of
clothing, shoes and books; increased
guidance services; special classes for the
physically handicapped; language laboratories; equipment of classrooms for radio
and television instruction; after school
study centers; institutes for special teacher
training.
In short, there is no limitation on the
kinds of distributive innovation which
educators are encouraged to suggest to
meet the needs of individuals and groups
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of disadvantaged children.
Titles II, III and IV of this bill are innovations in themselves, much needed innovations. According to Congressman
Carey, Title II, which brings 100 million
dollars in textbooks and teaching materials
into the hands of students and teachers
will produce a dividend of excellence far
beyond the size of the investment.
As for Titles III and IV, he foresees that
new centers of learning and research using all the public and private resources
available will set a new pattern in American education. They will enable each
school system public and non-public to
complement the other, to explore and expand on common strengths and to cure
common weaknesses.
Most important, these centers of cultural, artistic and instructional diversity
will bring the school and the educator into
the community and the community into the
entire educational process.
It is true that the federal programs
taken together amount to little more than
10% of state and other expenditures. But
as federal precedent set the way in civil
rights, in apportionment, in voting, the
supremacy of the federal principle is more
important than the dollars involved. It is
foreseeable that, with the growth of understanding and appreciation of the voluntary effort in private education, in the public purpose as worthy of public support,
that the cobwebbed antiquities in state law
will be discarded. These antiquities are
as outmoded in the diversity of a pluralistic society as is any limitation upon the
growth of education. There are too many
Americans who need and want education
today for any restriction upon our capacity
to make it available in quality and abundance.
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A few years ago the words "non-public
school" in a federal aid bill were unmentionable. In this year and from now on
the inclusion of all school children in all
federal programs is not only probable, it is
inevitable.
Law and the University
Paul L. O'Connor, S.J., President of
Xavier University in Cincinnati presents a
most scholarly justification for the university as a necessary means of preserving
our philosophy of law, in the May 1965
issue of Catholic Mind.
Father O'Connor explains that our
changing world does not seem to care for
the lessons of the past in the theory and
practice of the philosophy of law. To an
appalling degree our changing world either
ignores or rejects the notions of law. And
so it is very much the business of the legal
profession and the academic profession to
reflect on the true and saving glory of the
law and the university.
When you take the idea of reason away
from the idea of law you have destroyed
the very idea of law. When you say that
law is a practical thing and does not need
a philosophy to explain it and support it,
when you say that the American Constitution does not need the Declaration of
Independence to explain and support it,
then you have undermined the whole
structure of our political way of life; you
have turned a deaf ear to the traditions
which have made our nation great; you
have destroyed the sacred trust of the profession of the law.
For it is not just any philosophy that
will do for the support and sustaining of
the American system of law. It is only
the tradition in which the American republic was conceived and founded that

can explain and preserve that republic. It
is the philosophy which makes law the
work of reason and right and denies that
law is arbitrary will and naked might. It
is the philosophy that explains the law as
the servant of man, that explains law as
coming from a government which does
not exist for its own sake but exists for
the protection of human rights. This is
the philosophy which answers the question
"What is law?" only by first answering
the question "What is man?" For the law
exists for man and not vice versa. This is
the philosophy which insists that man is a
spiritual as well as a material being. Not
a cosmic ganglion as Oliver Wendell
Holmes believed. This is the philosophy
which sees man as the image of his
Creator, which sees him as endowed by
that Creator with rights which no man or
government can take away from him.
In times of change like these, the problem is not to prevent the change, out of
fear that the values of the past and present will be lost, nor is -it to promote the
change merely for the sake of change. It
is to guide and direct our changing world
so that it will neither lose the greatness
of the past nor fail to realize the promise
of the future.
The law and the university are needed
and eminently qualified to preserve the
past and to advance the future for they
have the stability and the perspective to
preserve the past, and the flexibility,
adaptability and dexterity to advance the
future.
As the Church is now engaged in reflection on its true nature, its true greatness, so now we need-our world of revolutionary change needs-an aggiornamento in the law. The law must rediscover
its true nature, must rediscover that it is
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a noble work of reason, that it is the protector and the servant of man and that it
can lead him to a glorious future.
The university and the law are needed
in these three movements: 1) in the movement toward world peace; 2) in the movement toward Christian unity; 3) in the
movement toward racial justice.
These great movements need the law.
They need the work of reason. They need
the help of the legal profession. They need
the help of the university. They need an
aggiornamento of the law. We must not
fail them. How can the words of Pope
John's encyclical Pacem in Terris fail to
ring in the ears of the legal profession:
Today the universal common good poses
problems of world-wide dimensions, which
cannot be adequately tackled or solved except by the efforts of public authorities endowed with a wideness of powers, structures and means of the same proportions:
that is, of public authorities which are in
a position to operate in an effective manner
on a world-wide basis. The moral order
itself, therefore, demands that such a form
of public authority be established.
How can we propose to lead the world
to a just and lasting peace through law
when some of our laws still contain the
statutes of segregation, when some of our
laws still contain evidences of pride and
hate rather than reason and justice?
The changes of our revolutionary age
will not necessarily be changes for the
better. Our times of change are not inevitably a period of improvement rather
than a period of deterioration. Our times
are times of deep, foreboding crisis, and
the crisis concerns our present subject,
viz., the work of reason. Our past success as a nation cannot be preserved for
our future happiness unless the philosophical basis of our past success is recovered

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SUMMER

1965

and applied to our future world. This
means that the Judeo-Christian-American
philosophy of the law must be clear and
it must be applied to the changing world
in which we live. This is not an automatic
process. As Walter Lippman says, "The
acquired culture is not transmitted in our
genes, and so the issue is always in doubt."
The crisis of our times is touch and go.
The issue hangs in the balance. If you
ask what you can do for your country,
Father O'Connor answers:
What we can do, you of the legal profession and we of the academic, is to reconstruct the public philosophy of law, to
make the law accomplish the work of reason, to rejuvenate the great tradition of
law which is our heritage, to achieve the
aggiornamento which our changing world
requires. This will, under God, mean much
for our country and for the world.
Aid to Education

As we go to press the New York Times
(July 27, 1965, p. 21, col. 3-4) reports
with respect to the aid to education controversy a matter of importance to parochial school educators. The Times revealed that Dr. James E. Allen, Jr., the
State Education Commissioner, ruled that
parochial school pupils will be permitted
to attend special public school classes financed entirely by the federal government.
Dr. Allen's view clears the way for the
allocation of $99,903,739 in federal aid
for special courses for pre-school and poor
children in such subjects as remedial reading. The ruling is likely to cause a controversy and perhaps a court test, because
the New York State Constitution prohibits
the use of public money for the aid of
schools run by a religious denomination.
New York City will be a main beneficiary of the federal funds, Dr. Allen said.
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Meetings are planned throughout the state
to discuss the aid program in detail.
Dr. Allen issued the interpretation of
the Education Department in a special
message being mailed to local public
school administrators, diocesan superintendents, private school officials and others
containing legal opinions on the Federal
Education Act of 1965. One opinion was
written by Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz, and the other, an expansion of Mr.
Lefkowitz's views, was by Dr. Charles A.
Brind, chief counsel of the Education Department.
Dr. Allen acknowledged that the department was putting a "liberal interpretation"
on the State Constitution and Mr. Lefkowitz's opinion. But he said that he favored
steps to bring youngsters of the state
"closer together" insofar as education was
concerned.
Attorney General Lefkowitz wrote to
Dr. Allen on July 15 in a letter made public today that if any state or local property,
credit or public money was used for the
programs required by the federal law it
would constitute aid to sectarian schools
and would violate the State Constitution.
But he wrote:
that the federal act does not require the
use of state money or money of local educational agencies, or property or credit of
a state or a local subdivision.
Thus the prohibition contained in the
constitution, would then be involved if the
entire cost of the programs in this state,
including administration thereof, is paid
out of federal grants.
Amplifying that view, Dr. Brind wrote
on behalf of the Education Department:
The opinion [of Mr. Lefkowitz] points
out that if the money from the federal
government continues to be identified as
federal money, then its use does not come

under the provisions of the State Constitution.
This means that whenever any school
district received any federal money . . .
it may not be commingled with other tax
or public moneys, but must be kept in a
special account in a bank so that it is
perfectly clear what disposition is being
made of it.
Dr. Brind went on to say that the federal money could be used to rent property,
retain teachers and purchase supplies.
"The teachers thus employed could be assigned to teach anywhere in the school
district, including sectarian schools," he
said.
Teachers' benefits and the standards
they must meet would remain the same as
in the public school system, and if the
teachers or any supplies are assigned to
sectarian institutions, the cost of the extra
benefits, such as retirement, would come
from federal funds, too, he asserted.
There is nothing to prevent a board of
education from renting property in a sectarian or other nonpublic institution, Dr.
Brind said, and, it could assign one of its
own public school rooms for the use of
programs under the federal law.
What the educators have in mind are
courses in such subjects as remedial reading which would be held after regular
school hours. Children from either public
or private school would meet in a central
location-all, of course, paid for from
federal aid.
Though a board of education does not
have the right to rent out its own property, Dr. Brind said, it could make room
available for use of special programs if
there is "complete recompense for light,
heat, property, etc. And that, hence, no
state or local funds are being used."
Spokesmen for Roman Catholic and
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Orthodox Jewish denominational schools
said yesterday they welcomed the state's
interpretation of the use of federal school
funds.
Msgr. Raymond P. Rigney, superintendent of Catholic schools for the Archdiocese of New York, called the ruling
''very encouraging." "We do hope that
we can cooperate to achieve the aims of
this education act for all the children of
this city," he said.
No immediate comment was available
from public school officials.
Moses I. Feuerstein, president of the

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
of America, said that "the Orthodox Jewish community welcomes this ruling because under it the greatest possible benefits of the federal education act will be
made available without discrimination to
the maximum number of children, regardless of their school affiliation."
Among the groups that have opposed
the provisions of the act permitting federal
aid to church-related schools, the American Jewish Congress has said it would test
the constitutionality of the program in the
courts.

INTRINSIC EVIL
(Continued)

sterilization (temporary), may such a
sterilization be directly intended in the absence of a pathological condition such as
menorrhagia, dysmenorrhea, or an irregular menstrual cycle? In other words, may
this kind of sterilization be intended as a
means for the further good of marital intimacy and in the presence of serious psychological reasons? To say that direct
sterilization is always wrong, to say that
indirect sterilization is licit only in the
presence of a physical pathological condition, is to narrow the area of moral dialogue.
More can be said and should be said
about the non-viability of the concept of
intrinsic evil. It is hoped that these reflections will stimulate some further discussion on the problem of moral evil in general and on the prudent unwillingness to
characterize any moral act as intrinsically
evil. "Intrinsically evil," applied too
freely, can place an albatross around the
neck of the user.

that the moral -act is intrinsically evil?
Take sterilization as a further example.
Sterilization in itself is morally indifferent;
indirect therapeutic sterilization in the
presence of a pathological disorder is
morally good; direct punitive sterilization
would be acceptable to anyone who accepts the De Lugo position on the lawfulness of direct killing of an aggressor in
the case of legitimate self-defense. If the
De Lugo position warrants direct killing of
a criminal in these circumstances, then a
fortiori, direct sterilization of a criminal
can be allowed because to intend directly
the death of the man himself is something
more serious than to intend directly the
mutilation of his generative system. The
further problem with the moral dimension of sterilization is the formidable question involved in the controversy over the
anovulants: if the anovulant results in a

